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INTRODUCTION
Effective negotiation skills are essential to the practice of law. A lawyer’s effectiveness as a
negotiator may often depend on a lawyer’s willingness to lie.1 Lying can be defined as “all means by
which one might attempt to create in some audience a belief at variance with one’s own … includ[ing]
intentional communicative acts, concealments and omissions.”2 Although the terms “lying” and
“deception” are sometimes distinguished in academia, for the purposes of this paper the terms will be
used interchangeably as the moral consequences are arguably the same.3
The tactical use of deception in negotiations has spurred debate in the legal ethics arena. Ethics
tends to be concerned with upholding principles of honesty, fairness, and good faith. A lawyer’s use of
deceptive negotiation tactics would therefore seem to violate the rules of legal ethics. However, certain
deceptive tactics are not only considered acceptable but are often even expected as part of common
negotiation practice. The prevailing view in the legal profession seems to be that “lawyers are free to
make use of at least some of the usual degree of deception involved in negotiations.”4 This presents a
compelling paradox: how can a legal negotiator act ethically but also deceptively?5
Given the practical realities of the legal profession, an examination into whether any amount of
deception in negotiations is or should be ethically permissible would be ultimately uninformative.
Rather, what must be analyzed is the degree of deception that we, as legal professionals, are willing to
permit in negotiations on both an ethical and strategic basis.
This paper will first illustrate the importance of regulating deceptive conduct in legal negotiations.
Second, this paper will examine the extent to which the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC), the
Alberta Law Society, and the American Bar Association (ABA) address the issue of deception in
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negotiation. Third, this paper will review the literature on the topic to demonstrate how permissible
forms of deception may be distinguished from what may be considered inappropriate deceptive
practices.
THESIS
This paper will draw on the Alberta Code, the ABA Model Code, and the literature on negotiation
theory and practice to recommend reform proposals to the LSUC Rules. The LSUC Rules in their
current state do not adequately address the issue of deception in negotiation. More detailed and clearer
rules would not only provide lawyers with better guidance on how to conduct themselves in negotiations
but would also improve the public perception of the legal profession as a whole.
i. The Importance of Regulating Deception in Negotiation
Each province in Canada requires that its lawyers abide by a code of legal ethics. These codes of
ethics are “the primary source of guidance for how lawyers ought to behave in practice.”6 It is therefore
imperative for the rules of legal ethics to clearly articulate and distinguish conduct that is ethically
permissible from conduct that is ethically impermissible.
Many codes of legal ethics are silent with respect to how the rules of professional conduct are to
apply in the negotiation context.7 As a result, some scholars have asserted that “in negotiation, more
than in other contexts, ethical norms can probably be violated with greater confidence.”8
Lawyers will often disagree on where the appropriately line is to be drawn between
acceptable negotiation tactics and “impermissible concealment or deception.”9 Consequently, if codes of
legal ethics fail to provide proper guidance on how lawyers ought to behave in negotiations, lawyers
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may justify deceptive or dishonest behavior on the basis of personal ethics.10
Lawyers who adhere to a rule-based model of personal ethics may argue that, unless expressly
prohibited by the law society rules, lying in negotiation will be ethically justifiable in all or most cases.11
These types of lawyers may manipulate ambiguities in the ethical rules in their own favour and justify
the use of certain deceptive practices based on their perception of their role as a lawyer. This “role
morality” type of justification is problematic as it may “lead to lawyers making decisions and taking
actions in a context devoid of ordinary moral beliefs, attitudes, and feelings, which are critical
judgement to the exercise of good judgement.” 12 Further, justifying deception on the basis of role
morality will arguably make it less likely that lawyers will “take personal responsibility” for their
actions.13
Further, if the rules of legal ethics are unclear or silent with respect to how lawyers are to properly
conduct themselves in negotiations, lawyers may rely on common negotiation practices to guide their
behavior. Wetlaufer conducted a research analysis on how lawyers will typically justify the use of
deceptive tactics in negotiation. The most common justifications were as follows: “there was no intent to
lie”; “it was not ethically impermissible to lie”; “it was strategic speak”; “there is no duty of disclosure”;
“it was only puffing”; “lying is permissible within the rules of the game”; “everybody does it”; and
“lying is useful in negotiations.”14 Wetlaufer’s findings demonstrate “the extent to which acceptable
forms of deception under conventional negotiation practice have crept into the lexicon and practice of
lawyer negotiation.”15 His findings also point to “the tensions between what is ethically permissible
under the legal ethics codes, what is legally forbidden, and what is expected under generally accepted
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conventions of negotiation practice.”16 A negotiation practice that is widespread and common will not
necessarily be ethical. Therefore, it is important for the rules of legal ethics to address both the
intersection and possible discrepancies between what is ethical and what is acceptable under common
negotiation practice.
Failing to effectively regulate the conduct of lawyers in negotiations may perpetuate the
perception that lawyers belong to a profession that condones dishonest behavior. If lawyers are viewed
to be untrustworthy, public confidence in the legal system will gradually erode.17 A loss of public
confidence in lawyers would fundamentally undermine the negotiation process and the justice system as
a whole. This demonstrates the fundamental importance of properly regulating deceptive behavior in
negotiations.
ii. Law Society of Upper Canada Rules of Professional Conduct
The Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) regulates the conduct of lawyers in Ontario. The
LSUC acknowledges the importance of negotiation as an alternate means of dispute resolution.18 Rule
3.2.-4 states that a lawyer, when appropriate, “should inform the client of ADR options and, if so
instructed, take steps to pursue those options.”19 The rule further provides that a lawyer shall “advise and
encourage the client to compromise or settle a dispute whenever it is possible to do so on a reasonable
basis.”20 By encouraging settlement as an alternate means of dispute resolution, the LSUC seems to be
tacitly acknowledging how negotiations have become “a gatekeeper step for access to justice.”21 In
Hryniak v Mauldin,22 the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the important role legal negotiations have
in facilitating access to justice and stated:
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ordinary Canadians cannot afford to access the adjudication of civil disputes. The cost and
delay associated with the traditional process means that … the trial process denies ordinary
people the opportunity to have adjudication. And while going to trial has long been seen as a
last resort, other dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and settlement are more
likely to produce fair and just results when adjudication remains a realistic alternative.23

This would seem to suggest that the negotiation process, like the trial process, must be regulated in a
way that produces fair, consistent and just outcomes.24 If regulatory schemes fail to limit or control the
use of deception in negotiations, negotiations may cease to be a reasonable alternative to litigation.
Certain LSUC rules ostensibly prohibit the use of deceptive negotiation tactics. LSUC Rule 7.2-1
provides that “a lawyer shall be courteous, civil, and act in good faith with all persons with whom the
lawyer has dealings in the course of their practice.”25 This ethical duty extends to “appearances and
proceedings before … arbitrators, mediators and others who resolve disputes, regardless of their
function or informality of their procedures.”26 This rule suggests that a lawyer owes a duty of good faith
not only to his or her client but also to an opposing party in a negotiation. In order to comply with Rule
7.2-1, a lawyer must refrain from conduct that is “rude, provocative, or disruptive.”27
It could be argued that telling certain types of lies in a negotiation (e.g. “selective disclosure,
extreme initial offers, lies concerning bottom lines” etc.28) is inconsistent with a lawyer’s ethical
obligation to act in good faith. However, there is no specific requirement in Rule 7.2-1 that a lawyer act
“honesty” or refrain from certain types of deceptive conduct.29 Accordingly, some legal academics have
suggested that it is what the LSUC rules “do not say rather than what they do say – that can cause us to
question the extent of the commitment to honesty.”30 Therefore, in Ontario, without further guidance or

Ibid at para 24. But see Owen M Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1983-1984) 93:6 Yale LJ (“settlement of a school suit might secure the
peace but not racial equality … it is not justice itself … [t]o settle for something means to accept less than some ideal” at 1085-1086).
24 Tsakalis, supra note 21 at 3.
25 LSUC, supra note 18 at Rule 7.2-1 [emphasis added].
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Tsakalis, supra note 21 at 9.
29 Although LSUC Rule 3.2-2 requires a lawyer be “honest and candid”, this rule explicitly applies in the context of the lawyer-client
relationship.
30 Pitel, supra note 4 at 51.
23
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clarification from the LSUC, it is unclear whether a lawyer’s ethical duty to act in good faith requires a
lawyer to adhere to a minimum standard of honesty in negotiations.31
In addition to a lawyer’s ethical duty to act in good faith, LSUC Rule 2.1-1 requires a lawyer to
“carry on the practice of law and discharge all responsibilities to … the public and other members of the
profession honourably and with integrity.”32 Similar to Rule 7.2-1, Rule 2.1-1 suggests that a lawyer
owes a duty of integrity to an opposing party in a negotiation. According to the rule, “a lawyer’s conduct
should reflect favourably on the legal profession, inspire the confidence, respect and trust … of the
community, and avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”33 The commentary of the rule states that “if
integrity is lacking, the lawyer’s usefulness to the client and reputation within the profession will be
destroyed”34and that “dishonorable or questionable conduct on the part of a lawyer in … professional
practice will reflect adversely upon the integrity of the profession and administration of justice.”35
Further, acting without integrity may lead to an erosion of “public confidence in the administration of
justice and in the legal profession.”36
The use of certain deceptive tactics in negotiation has the potential to damage a lawyer’s
reputation, destroy public confidence in lawyers and adversely impact the integrity of the legal
profession as whole. Therefore, it could be argued that lying in negotiations is inconsistent with a
lawyer’s ethical duty to act with integrity.37 However, this is only speculative as the LSUC does not
clearly define the concept of integrity nor does it give guidance to lawyers on how to act consistent with

Ibid at 50 (“this rule would send a much clearer message if it made specific reference to honesty”).
LSUC, supra note 18 at Rule 2.1-2.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Pitel, supra note 4 at 50.
31
32
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the notion of integrity. For this reason, the rule of integrity tends to be relegated to a supplementary role
or a “general ethical principle,” rather than a stand-alone ethical duty.38
In spite of a lawyer’s ethical obligations to act in good faith and with integrity, it can be argued
that lawyers owe other “special duties” to their clients that “render ethically permissible, even
mandatory, acts that we would otherwise regard as ethically impermissible.”39 For example, when acting
as an advocate, a lawyer has the ethical duty to “raise fearlessly every issue, advance every argument
and ask every question, however distasteful, that the lawyer thinks will help the client’s case”40 A
lawyer may be able to justify the use of a wide range of deceptive tactics on the basis that he or she was
“acting as a zealous advocate for their client.”41 Support for an adversarial and client-centric approach to
negotiations is also found in the common law. In Martel Building Ltd v Canada, the Supreme Court of
Canada stated that “[t]he primary goal of any economically rational actor engaged in commercial
negotiation is to achieve the most advantageous financial bargain . . . in the context of bilateral
negotiation, such gains are realized at the expense of the other negotiating party. 42
Lawyers also have a general ethical obligation to “conduct all cases faithfully and to the best of
[his or her] ability … and [to] faithfully serve and diligently represent the best interests of [his or her]
client.43 This is sometimes referred to as a lawyer’s “duty of loyalty.”44 Acting in a client’s best interests
does not require that a lawyer achieve the fairest or most equitable outcome. Rather, it will often
demand that a lawyer attempt to “get the best bargain” for their client.45 Therefore, even if lawyers have
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Randal NM Graham, Legal Ethics: Theories, Cases, and Professional Regulation, 3rd ed, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications,
2014) at 118 [Graham].
39 Wetlaufer, supra note 1 at 356.
40 LSUC, supra note 18 at Rule 5.1-1.
41 White, supra note 5 at 930.
42 2000 SCC 60 at para 60.
43 Graham, supra note 38 at 120.
44 Wetlaufer, supra note 1 at 356.
45 Pitel, supra note 4 at 48.
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a general deontological duty not to lie, these rules seem to allow for the use of some level of deception
in the negotiation context.46
When viewed as a whole, the LSUC Rules seem to give conflicting ethical guidance to lawyers.
On the one hand, Rule 7.2-1 and Rule 2.2-1 advocate a cooperative and non-adversarial approach to
dispute resolution, which would presumptively prohibit the use of deception. On the other hand, Rule
5.1-1 and a lawyer’s duty of loyalty encourages a competitive and client-centric approach to dispute
resolution, which would arguably justify the use of various deceptive negotiation tactics. For this reason,
it has been argued that the LSUC Code promotes “competing negotiation styles that, while not
necessarily mutually exclusive, are often at odds with each other.”47 Without any further clarification
from the LSUC, it is difficult to ascertain how a lawyer is to achieve a proper balance between acting as
a zealous advocate on the one hand and conducting him or herself with integrity and good faith on the
other.
The inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity in the LSUC Rules arguably perpetuates a
‘negotiation culture’ that encourages or at least does not expressly prohibit dishonest practice. The nonspecific nature of the LSUC Rules allows lawyers to interpret the rules to their own advantage. As a
result, the rules may have little to no influence at curtailing deceptive behaviours by lawyers in
negotiations. Even honest lawyers who wish to abide by ethical rules “may be forfeiting a significant
advantage for [their] client[s]” if opposing lawyers do not interpret the rules in the same way.48 This
illustrates a fundamental problem with the LSUC Code.
iii. The Alberta Code of Professional Conduct
Unlike the LSUC Code, the Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct (“Alberta
Code”) provides specific guidance to lawyers on how to conduct themselves in negotiations. The
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Alberta Code contains rules that explicitly address deceptive negotiation tactics. This approach to legal
ethics distinguishes Alberta’s Code from all other Canadian provinces.49
Rule 6.02(2) of the Alberta Code states that a lawyer must not deliberately mislead another
lawyer or colleague in any situation, “including a negotiation.”50 Misleading conduct is defined as
“creating a misconception through oral or written statements, other communications, actions or conduct,
failure to act, or silence.”51 Rule 6.02(2) therefore has the potential to render a wide range of deceptive
conduct ethically impermissible.
According to Rule 6.02(2), if a lawyer is asked a question that he or she is unable to truthfully
answer due to client confidentiality, a lawyer cannot answer with a falsehood.52 In this type of situation,
a lawyer must decline to answer. However, if declining to answer would “in itself be misleading,” the
lawyer is required to seek his or her “client’s consent to such disclosure of confidential information as is
necessary to prevent the other lawyer from being mislead.”53 Unlike the LSUC Code, the Alberta Code
specifically states that lawyers owe a duty of honesty to not just their clients, but to opposing parties in a
negotiation.
Rule 6.02(3) of the Alberta Code provides that a lawyer “… must not take advantage of or act
without fair warning upon slips, irregularities or mistakes on the part of other lawyers not going to the
merits or involving the sacrifice of a client’s rights.”54 The application of this rule is triggered if two
elements are present: 1) “an obvious mistake by opposing counsel” and a benefit flowing from that
mistake to which the lawyer’s client is clearly not entitled.”55 The commentary to Rule 6.02(3)

Pitel, supra note 4 at 52 (“the Alberta approach is dramatically different from that adopted in other provinces, and it demands serious
study.”)
50 Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct, Rule 6.02(2), online: Law Society of Alberta
<http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/docs/default-source/regulations/code.pdf?sfvrsn=2> [Law Society of Alberta].
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid at Rule 6.02(3).
55 Ibid.
49
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importantly distinguishes an obvious mistake (such as a clerical or arithmetical error) from “an act or
omission by another lawyer that appears questionable but that may have involved a conscious exercise
of judgment.”56 For example, although it may appear that an opposing party has mistakenly agreed to an
“unfavourable contract or settlement offer,”57 this “may have been the result of careful consideration,
including factors of which the lawyer is not aware” rather than the result of an error.58 If a lawyer
becomes aware that he or she has unintentionally mislead the opposing party during the course of the
negotiation, the lawyer must “immediately correct the resulting misapprehension.”59
The Alberta Law Society has attempted to provide its members with guidance on what types of
deceptive conduct to avoid in negotiations. The Alberta Code addresses how a lawyer is to balance a
client’s interests with his or her duty to “other lawyers, the public interest, and the need for a fair
process.”60 The Alberta Code is arguably less “client-centric” than the LSUC Code as it specifically
focuses on a lawyer’s duty to opposing parties in a negotiation. Some legal scholars have argued that
while in some cases, a client may be denied a certain benefit or bargaining advantage, “such losses are a
small sacrifice for preserving the honour and integrity of the profession.”61
Although the Alberta Code overcomes many of the shortcomings in the LSUC Code, it fails to
acknowledge that certain types of deceptive tactics may be an expected part of the bargaining process.
“Misleading conduct” as defined in Rule 6.02(3) could potentially capture a range of lies and deceptive
behaviours that most lawyers consider acceptable negotiation practice. The Alberta rules would be more
in line with the practical realities of negotiation culture if the definition of “misleading conduct” was
slightly more refined.

56
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iv. The ABA Model as a “Model”?
The United States has a national bar called the American Bar Association (“ABA”). The ABA
has attempted to consolidate the different jurisdictional rules of legal ethics into a single model code: the
ABA Model.62 The ABA Model demonstrates how it is possible for a code of legal ethics to distinguish
impermissible forms of deception from deceptive tactics that are generally considered to be acceptable
negotiation practice.
ABA Model Rule 4.1 explicitly deals with deception in negotiation. The rule states that “in the
course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact
or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person …”63 The commentary on
the rule provides that,
under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements are not taken
as statements of material fact … [e]stimates of price or value placed on the subject of a
transaction and a party’s intention as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in
this category.64

By explicitly prohibiting lies only in reference to “material facts” the ABA seems to be
implicitly allowing the use of deception as long as it does not relate to material facts. For example, it has
been suggested that the wording of Rule 4.1 allows a legal negotiator to “engage in ‘product puffing’,
exaggeration of the value of a product, and even outright lying or deception within the bounds outlined
[in the rule].”65 These types of deceptive behaviours are widely considered to be acceptable in common
negotiation practice.66 In contrast, empirical studies have shown that lawyers typically view lies about
material facts to be “unethical, inappropriate, and unacceptable.”67 The ABA therefore forbids conduct

American Bar Association, “Model Rules of Professional Conduct”, online: ABA
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/model_rules_of_professional_conduct> [ABA Model Rules].
63 Ibid at Rule 4.1.
64 Ibid.
65 Truth About Lying, supra at 6 at 7.
66 Ibid.
67 Curtailing Deception, supra note 11 at 177.
62

11

that many legal professionals already consider to be inappropriate. As a result, the ABA Model is not
only practically informative but it also seems to be in line with the current negotiation culture.
When compared with the LSUC Code and the Alberta Code, the ABA Model seems to offer
more effective and practical guidance to lawyers. The Alberta Code is arguably too specific as it seems
to prohibit any type of misrepresentation in negotiation, even lies that are widely considered to be an
acceptable part of negotiation practice. The LSUC Code is arguably overly broad as it seems to permit a
potentially limitless range of deceptive behavior. The ABA Model, in contrast, seems to strike an
appropriate balance between the general and specific.
v. The Literature on Deception in Negotiation
Negotiation theory recognizes that “parties to a negotiation, even one that starts out as interestbased, may engage in deceptive tactics as part of the [negotiation] game.”68 However, the question
remains: what happens when the rules of legal ethics conflict with widespread negotiation conventions
or practices? Some lawyers argue that the rules of legal ethics must “bow to prevailing negotiation ethics
which condone certain forms of deception.”69 Others argue that prevailing negotiation ethics must give
way to the rules of legal ethics. The literature on deception in negotiation offers persuasive insight on
how the rules of legal ethics should properly intersect with generally acceptable negotiation practices.
Cooley suggests that legal ethical rules must be “compatible with the [negotiation] game’s nature
and purpose … must not significantly interfere with the means by which the players can accomplish the
game’s purpose [i.e., to resolve conflict] … must be comprehensible, reasonable and fair …”70
Therefore, what must first be determined is the nature and purpose of legal negotiation.
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According to Bordone, a “successful” negotiation is one that leads to a “good outcome.”71 A
good outcome is not “boiled down to a binary question of whether a particular … [party] won or lost.”72
Rather, the characteristics of a “good outcome” are defined as follows:
better than [the parties’] best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA); meets [the
parties’] interests very well, the interests of the other side acceptably …; is the most efficient
and value-creating of many possible sets of deal terms; [and] improves or at least does not
harm the relationship between the parties where ‘relationship’ is defined as the ability of the
parties to ‘manage their differences well.73

In light of Bordone’s criteria, the “purpose” of negotiations may be condensed into three fundamental
objectives. First, to secure a mutually advantageous outcome that leaves the parties no worse off than
they would have been otherwise.74 Second, to reach a mutually advantageous outcome in an efficient
manner. Third, to come up with as many value-creating ways of expanding the “pie.”
The literature suggests that lies which conflict with the three fundamental negotiation objectives
will effectively undermine the negotiation process as a whole. However, lies that advance – or at least
do not hinder – these objectives, are more likely to be considered part of the negotiation game.
a. Mutually Advantageous Goal
The mutual advantage approach to negotiation permits parties to “initiate deception, so long as
the possibility is fair (and hence mutually understood by the involved parties) and potentially mutually
advantageous.”75 There are many lies that are mutually understood by both parties to be an expectable
part of the bargaining process. If successful, these types of lies may have the potential to give rise to
mutually satisfactory outcomes.

Robert C Bordone, ‘Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for Process-Enabling Ethical Codes’ (2005) 21 Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution 1, 16.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Alan Strudler, On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation in Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds, What’s Fair: Ethics for
Negotiators (Jossey-Bass, 2004) at 138 [Strudler].
75 Ibid at 153
71
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Lying about one’s reservation price, for example, is generally considered to be a “normal and
expectable” part of the bargaining process.76 If a lawyer were to state the truth about a client’s
reservation price, that lawyer may take “an unreasonable risk” if the opposing party chooses to
exaggerate theirs.77 For this reason, parties will often come to a mutual understanding that each of the
parties in a negotiation will exaggerate their reservation price to a degree. This type of deception can be
effective if the parties are “competent”; “[have] reason to know about the existence of conventions
permitting limited deception”; and “[have] a fair and equal opportunity to safely get information about
his opponent’s reservation price.”78 The presence of these elements can help facilitate a “safe device for
indirect communication” that both parties can use to their advantage.79 This type of deception can be
seen as useful tool that individuals who “neither know nor trust one another can use to work their way to
a reasonable agreement.”80
Lying about one’s reservation price can help produce mutually advantageous outcomes even
when one party makes a gain at the other party’s expense. A mutually advantageous outcome is not
necessarily one that produces equitable results. If the use of deception allows one party to make a higher
profit than the other, but leaves the other party no worse off than they would have been otherwise, the
negotiation can still be classified as “mutual advantageous.”
Wetlaufer provides the following example to illustrate how this can occur in practice.
A seller who enters into a negotiation for the purposes of selling his factory may have a
reservation price of $900,000. If a potential buyer comes to the negotiation table and states that she will
not pay higher than $1,200,000 for the factory, the seller has incentive to lie about his reservation price.
The seller may state that his reservation price is $1,100,000 ($200,000 above his actual reservation price

76

Ibid at 139.
Ibid at 152
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79 Ibid at 152
80 Ibid.
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of $900,000). If the two parties agree to a final sales agreement of $1,150,000 for the factory, both the
buyer and the seller will come out of the negotiation satisfied.81 Even though the tactical use of
deception by the seller allowed it to make a higher profit than the buyer, the buyer still paid less than
than the maximum it was willing to pay.
Wetlaufer’s example demonstrates that the advantages that both parties can gain from this type
of deception may “outweigh the disadvantages of the costs of deceptive negotiation.”82
b. Efficiency Goal
Efficiency is one of the fundamental goals of negotiation.83 An efficient negotiation is not
necessarily one that is cost-effective. For example, a negotiation can be costly but still efficient if the
“issues are dealt with in a timely manner with mutually beneficial outcomes.”84 As a result, lies that
promote efficiency by helping facilitate timely settlements are more likely to be viewed as appropriate
forms of deception.
White lies, for example, may help promote efficiency as they are often told “to grease the wheels
of discourse, and to increase the likelihood that the parties will move quickly toward a mutually
beneficial agreement.”85 White lies also tend to have a relatively harmless effect on the party the lie is
told to. 86 Puffery is similar in kind to white lies. As a result, lawyers have generally considered both
white lies and puffs to be permissible on both an ethical and strategic basis.87
A basic level of trust is essential in a negotiation. Lies that lack credibility may “stand in the way
of building trust” and fail to promote efficiency.88 As a result, deceptive negotiation tactics such as false
threats and bluffing should be used with caution. The rationale behind these forms of deception is to put
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pressure on the opposing side to agree to a settlement or to make certain concessions.89 For example, a
party may threaten to walk away from the negotiation and bring the matter to court or threaten to inflict
economic harm on the opposing party.90 These types of threats are frequently used by more powerful
negotiating parties with stronger BATNAs.91
These lies may promote efficiency by incentivizing parties to resolve the dispute in an effective
and timely manner. However, in order for these lies to be successful, the threat or bluff must be
credible.92 For example, if the deceptive party presents some reliable documentation in support of a
threat, the threat will have more credibility and will be more likely to be believed by the opposing party.
If a threat is not credible, “the less powerful party might resent the sense of coercion or inequity inherent
in the … [opposite party’s] demands and refuse to yield, even knowing that this course of action will
cause harm to both sides.”93 This demonstrates the importance of credibility, especially when there are
power imbalances at play.
Lies about material facts are widely considered to be ethically impermissible in negotiations.
According to Jarvis and Tellam, “even if no violation of law would result, a lawyer must not make
material misrepresentations, conceal material facts or advise or assist a client in doing so.”94 Unlike lies
about one’s reservation price, these types of lies have the potential to greatly hinder rather than enhance
efficiency. It would be extremely difficult for parties to conduct their affairs in an efficient and
productive manner if they constantly feared being deceived or mislead about something as basic as a
material fact.95 As a result, the prevalence of these types of lies may effectively deter individuals from
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pursuing negotiation as an alternate means of dispute resolution in the future. Lies about material facts
are expressly prohibited in the ABA Model Code for this reason.
Similar to lies about material facts, lies about one’s authority are generally considered to be an
impermissible form of deception in negotiations. When a lawyer falsely claims that he or she lacks the
authority to decide on a certain subject matter, the opposing party may feel pressured to settle in fear of
delaying the negotiation. Although these types of lies may ostensibly promote efficiency by potentially
speeding up the negotiation process, parties who are manipulated in this way “may be resentful later and
exercise their power either by failing to follow through on the agreement of by seeking revenge the next
time the parties meet.”96 Therefore, the adverse impact these lies may potentially have on subsequent
negotiations may outweigh any short-term benefits the lies produce.
If lawyers are able to consistently “get away” with these kinds of deceptive negotiation tactics,
lawyers may fail to ask themselves whether truthful alternatives exist that could achieve the same
intended purpose.97 For example, instead of lying about his or her authority, a lawyer could state to the
opposing side that he/she is not prepared to decide on a certain matter at the current time. Re-framing
the statement in this way could have the same effect as the lie, but will not damage the lawyer’s
reputation nor the integrity of the legal profession.
The literature provides persuasive rationales to support why lawyers should avoid telling lies
about material facts and lies about one’s authority. It also demonstrates that a lawyer should exercise
caution before exaggerating a client’s reservation price, making a false threat, or even telling a white lie.
Although these types of lies are generally considered acceptable as part as the negotiation game, a gross
exaggeration about one’s reservation price, a false threat that lacks credibility or a white lie that is told
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without a genuine purpose may undermine the negotiation process as a whole. If society perceives the
legal profession to be one that condones and frequently engages in lying when conducting affairs, public
trust in lawyers will gradually start to erode. A decline in public trust can lead to a decline in “our ability
to engage in effective communications and to make and exchange credible commitments.”98
c. Value-Creating or “Problem-Solving” Goal
Russell Korobkin defines negotiation as:
an interactive communication process by which two or more parties who lack identical
interests attempt to find a way to coordinate their behavior or allocate scarce resources in a
way that will make them better off than they could be if they were to act alone.99

This definition reflects the importance of effective problem-solving skills in negotiations. Parties who
adopt a “problem-solving” or “value-creating” approach to negotiation100 will try to come up with
creative ways of reaching mutually beneficial outcomes by focusing on discovering each other’s true
underlying values and interests.101 The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates the effectiveness of this type of
negotiation strategy, especially when both parties are particularly “non-cooperative.”102
Lies that involve a concealment of a client’s true interests may prevent parties from reaching a
mutually beneficial agreement. If one party is unaware of what the other party wishes to gain from the
negotiation, it will be extremely difficult to come up with creative ways of dividing the proverbial pie.103
For example, one party may have been willing to make certain concessions or compromises (that would
have been beneficial to the other party) but refrained from doing so because the other party concealed its
true interests and values.104 This demonstrates how a lack of transparency can effectively prevent parties
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from reaching a mutually advantageous agreement that may have otherwise been available to them. By
acting in an un-cooperative manner, parties may “miss opportunities for expanding the range of
solutions” and arrive at “unsatisfactory and inefficient” outcomes.105
Effective communication is essential in any negotiation.106 For a negotiation to properly
progress, “negotiators must communicate to the other party their issues, interests, positions and
goals.”107 Omitting important pieces of information may have the effect of undermining the negotiation
process as a whole.108 For these reasons, concealing a client’s true interests is a form of deception that is
generally considered to be “outside” the bounds of the negotiation game.109
LSUC Reform Proposals
This paper recommends that the LSUC reform their Code of Professional Conduct to include
rules that explicitly address the issue of deception in negotiations. Although the LSUC acknowledges
the importance of alternate means of dispute resolution, it fails to recognize the lawyer’s specific role as
a negotiator. The following proposals are influenced by the rules in the Alberta Code the ABA Model
Code, as well as the literature on deception in negotiation.
Recommendation 1:
The LSUC should adopt a similar rule to Alberta’ Rule 6.02(2) that prevents lawyers
from misleading other lawyers during negotiations. However, like ABA Rule 4.1, this rule should be
limited to expressly prohibiting misrepresentations of material facts. In addition to prohibiting lies about
material facts, this rule would also prevent a lawyer from lying about his or her authority.
Recommendation 2:
The LSUC should adopt a rule that requires lawyers to adhere to minimum standard of honesty
and good faith in negotiations. Although a duty of honesty is implied in Recommendation 1, a separate
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ethical obligation of this nature would help reinforce the importance of honesty in the negotiation
context. Establishing a minimum standard of honesty and good faith could also help enhance public
confidence in both the negotiation process and legal profession as a whole.
The Supreme Court of Canada found it important to create a separate common law duty of
honest performance in Bhasin v Hrynew.110 The duty of honest performance flows directly from the
overarching principle of good faith and imposes a minimum standard honesty in all contractual
relationships. The Court stated that the doctrine of honest performance may be relaxed in some contexts
so long as its “minimum core requirements” are respected.111 This rule would similarly recognize the
contextual nature of negotiations, as what is acceptable in one context may be unacceptable in another
due to “differences between civil and criminal contexts, factual matrices, and power relations between
parties.”112
Although it has yet to be determined whether Bhasin applies in the negotiation context, the
decision offers persuasive support for why legal negotiators should be required to uphold a minimum
standard of honesty.
Recommendation 3:
The LSUC should enact a rule similar to Rule 6.02(3) of the Alberta Code. This rule would state
that in a negotiation, a party must refrain from taking advantage of any obvious slip-ups or mistakes
inadvertently made by the opposing party. This rule is particularly relevant where parties are of unequal
bargaining strength as it would help prevent some of the adverse effects of power imbalances in
negotiations. Further, this rule would encourage participation in the negotiation process and promote
confidence in the legal profession.
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CONCLUSION
Legal negotiation has become an important dispute resolution alternative to litigation. It provides
many Canadians with the opportunity to resolve disputes in a timely and efficient manner. However,
failing to regulate certain types of deceptive behavior may unduly inhibit the negotiation process and
potentially discourage participation in this alternative to costly and prolonged litigation. As a result, the
LSUC Code needs to be revised to include rules that specifically address honesty and deception in
negotiations.
Reforming the LSUC Code will not only better serve the individuals who rely on negotiation as a
primary means of access to justice but will help improve the public perception of lawyers and the
integrity of the legal profession as a whole. Rules that provide appropriate guidance to lawyers in
negotiations may also increase the likelihood of mutually beneficial outcomes for the parties. Lawyers
may be more inclined to adopt negotiation strategies that are cooperative and value-creating, rather than
adversarial and client-centric.
Admittedly, drafting ethical rules that govern the negotiation process is an inherently difficult
task. A certain level of precision and specificity is required in order for the rules to have any real
influence on the behaviors of lawyers. However, if the ethical rules are too specific or conflict with
generally acceptable negotiation practices, the rules may unintentionally inhibit the effectiveness of the
negotiation process. The recommended proposals have attempted to strike a delicate balance between
the general and the specific. The LSUC has a responsibility and duty to address this important issue in a
positive and constructive way.
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